CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

REPORT NO. [redacted]

CD NO.

COUNTRY	Rumania	DATE OF INFORMATION	1951
SUBJECT	Economic - Petroleum		
HOW PUBLISHED	Monthly periodical	DATE DIST.	8 Apr 1952
WHERE PUBLISHED	Bucharest	NO. OF PAGES	13
DATE PUBLISHED	Mar 1951		
LANGUAGE	Rumanian	SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.	

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SOURCE Probleme Economice.

DIFFICULTIES IN RUMANIAN OIL PRODUCTION, 1950

C. Filoreanu
Member of Executive Committee
General Confederation of Labor

Achievements of the Rumanian oil industry thus far cannot hide serious technical and organizational deficiences evident in a number of oil fields. These deficiencies were made public in a decision of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party and of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, of 3 February 1951, concerning the strengthening of labor discipline, the prevention of damage to equipment, and absenteeeism in the oil industry. The decision of the Central Committee and of the Council of Ministers constitutes a document of importance for the future development of our oil industry.

Stressing absenteeism, accidents, and damages to equipment which, during 1950, caused delays and stoppages in production and drilling operations, the decision established several measures designed to eliminate deficiencies, and to assure higher efficiency of labor in the oil industry.

Detailed analysis of a model oil-production enterprise, Sovrompetrol of Campina, will serve to show other enterprises how to overcome their difficulties. The Campina collective won the Red Flag as the best oil-field collective for the second half of 1950.

During the first half of 1950, the reorganization of labor and the introduction of new methods led to increased efficiency of operation. Three types of sections were established, a workers' section divided into brigades, a technological service, and a repair section. Each workers' section was headed by an engineer who was responsible for fulfillment of drilling and repair programs. The technical service was responsible for immediate and emergency

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repairs. The repair section made routine repair and restored abandoned wells to operation. Thus, within the first 6 months of 1950, 60 abandoned oil wells were put back into operation. This resulted in an 8.32 percent greater productive potential of the field.

During the first half of 1950, Soviet techniques were adopted by the oil industry, i.e., two-shaft parallel drilling, moving of entire rig equipment, use of automatic, square bits, use of the Krilov funnel, etc. Largely as a result of the adoption of these methods, the drilling plan of the first half of 1950 was exceeded by 11.38 percent and the production plan by 0.86 percent.

This important achievement was accompanied by a 9.54 percent increase in the productive capacity of labor (over that of the second half of 1949) which, in turn, contributed to the 24.38 percent reduction in production costs, thus making it possible for the enterprise to exceed the requirements of the plan.

The oil-field committee contributed to these achievements by organizing socialist competitions for workers and technicians, by supervising closely the results and recording them for each oil well, by popularizing the achievements of the production leaders, by organizing regular production conferences to analyze the proposed programs, for exceeding the requirements of the plan, and for finding the best way to eliminate difficulties encountered in production. Special attention was devoted to trade-union groups which were encouraged to engage in extensive activities. The trade-union groups held regular production conferences, and their leaders brought up for discussion all accidents or damages to equipment, as well as the production problems of individual groups.

The collective of the Baicoi oil field achieved the important distinction of being awarded the Red Flag for petroleum production for the first half of 1950.

Administrative reorganization of the oil field took place in the second half of 1950. The new organizational plan was clear and well developed, but its adoption was slow and ineffective. Moreover, the management personnel had difficulty in adjusting itself and accepting the improved system of organization.

The over-all reorganization of the oil field required too much time -- 1½ months -- which reduced production. The management of the oil field did not study with sufficient care either the composition of the new brigades, or the training of the new brigade leaders, with the result that many brigades were unable to accomplish their assigned tasks. Reactionary elements tried to create confusion in connection with the administrative reorganization of the oil field. The enterprise committee -- which was also reorganized during this period -- did not adequately explain the new system to old and new workers. This lessened the authority of the management of the Baicoi oil field.

This situation, so detrimental to the smooth operation of the oil field, led to several breaches of discipline. Thus, Brigade Leader Sandulescu, of the Fourth Production Section, falsified reports by not informing the technical management of damages to several oil wells, and of other technological accidents. Similarly, in the rigging section, Constantin Matei refused to obey orders given by his chief.

Unfortunately, the administrative and trade-union organizations of the Baicoi oil field did not concern themselves with improving labor discipline. Their negligence was partly responsible for the failure of this oil field to fulfill the requirements of the plan.

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It must also be emphasized that the failure of certain oil wells to keep charts prevented a close check on their activities, and was responsible for a series of accidents requiring much time for repairs.

During the second half of 1950, a total of 3,836 hours were spent in repairing damaged drilling equipment at the Baicoi oil field. Some of these accidents were due to drillers' mistakes, reflecting serious breaches of discipline. Thus, at well No 12, while the driller, Nicolae Bucur was drilling at a depth of 1,065 meters the bit caught in the well. Instead of consulting his comrades on the best way to loosen the bit, the driller maneuvered the bit in such a manner as to break the 4½ inch casing. It required 4 days to repair the damage.

A similar case occurred at well No 802. As a result of the negligence of Drillers Tudor Misiru and Smolian, the casing at the mouth of the well was broken and oil gushed out. It required 7 days to repair the damage.

In several cases, the instructions given by section chiefs lacked clarity and led to accidents. Thus, at oil well No 2 (Floresti), the section engineer failed to be explicit in his instructions concerning cementation, with the result that the casing was imbeded in concrete. It required many days to repair the damage.

The large number of accidents adversely affected our national economy not only by diverting much active working time to repair work, but also by requiring replacements for much equipment lost in the wells. The value of drilling equipment lost in the wells amounted to 3 million lei. How much more effectively could this money have been used for improving the living conditions of the drillers!

The lack of collaboration between the management and the major repair service of the oil field was also responsible for the poor organization of labor at Baicoi. This lack of collaboration was so serious that the chief of the repair service failed to inform the management of the nature of the repairs performed, and even refused to make suggestions for assuring the steady flow of oil. The lack of collaboration between the two technical leaders also led to a decline in their authority. The repair teams, lacking proper advice, took too much time to do their work. A repair job, which took 48 hours before the reorganization, required 14 days during the second half of 1950. As a result, many oil wells at Baicoi were out of commission for much longer than anticipated.

Some natural difficulties were encountered in drilling, such as adverse geological conditions, damage to drilling equipment resulting from flooding, sand, and corrosion, delays in the opening of new wells, and an increasingly rapid decline in the productivity of old ones. These conditions were less detrimental, however, than the failure of the administrative organs to organize the production process properly.

Even more harmful was the conduct of the enterprise committee which entrusted only two or three men with the leadership of trade-union affairs instead of enlisting the participation of everyone. The organizing of committees for special problems, which might have been of great assistance to the enterprise committee, was not even attempted. The activities of the various trade-union groups, so extensive during the first 6 months, came to a virtual standstill as a result of the rapid turnover of leaders. Production conferences, which might have been of assistance in solving some of the production problems, were held infrequently during the second half of 1950. Moreover, there were no trade-union group conferences.

The enterprise committee allowed socialist competition to fall behind, satisfying itself with the conclusion of "competition contracts," and failed to stimulate the workers' interest in problems of production. Consequently, competition by jobs, a more advanced form of individual competition, was abandoned in November although it had proven to be successful in the past.

The deficiencies of the management of the oil field and of the trade-union organs were largely responsible for the poor showing of the Baicoi collective, which fulfilled only 98.73 percent of its plan for exploitational drilling, and only 92.94 percent of the plan for exploratory drilling, during the second half of 1950.

For these reasons, the Baicoi collective lost the Red Flag for production and the title of leading collective for its branch, and joined the ranks of collectives which had fallen behind in their production quotas.

Drilling in the Campina oil field, which includes Varful Draganei, Draganeasa, Campina, Bustenari, Chiciura, Bordeeni, Campinita, Povita, and other locations, is difficult because of the configuration of the terrain. During the first half of 1950, drilling was successfully completed at only 13 of the 16 wells where it had been begun. Consequently, at the Campina oil field, only 88.05 percent of the plan for exploitational drilling and only 87.6 percent of the plan for exploratory drilling was fulfilled.

What were the reasons for the nonfulfillment of the drilling plan during the first half of 1950?

First, there was a failure to plan adequate locations for new oil wells and surface work, which led to delays in putting new wells into operation. The Geological Service was also responsible for this deficiency. The Exploitation Service of the oil fields of the former Petrolifera Muntenia, not only delayed planning of new locations, but also ignored the nature of the terrain and the time required for installing surface installations. This caused nearly a month's delay in the beginning of drilling operations at the new wells. Thus, drilling at oil well No 10 (Rancu) was scheduled to begin on 10 May; yet, as late as 25 May, work had not even begun. Similarly, at well No 11 (Rancu), where drilling was scheduled to begin early in May, the electrical equipment had not arrived by the end of the month.

Another reason for the nonfulfillment of the drilling plan was the poor organization of the processes involved. The administrative management was aware of the fact that twice as many wells had to be drilled in 1950 as in 1949, and these under different geological conditions; nevertheless, it failed to provide the proper laboratory conditions for solving the problem of the mud. The failure to study and use the mud corresponding to the geological strata which had to be pierced, prevented the most effective utilization of the available drilling equipment, and led to a decrease in drilling speed.

Consequently, instead of attaining the speed of 326 meters of drilling per month in exploratory drilling realized during the first 6 months, a speed of only 149.4 meters of drilling per month was attained during the second. Similarly, in exploitational drilling, a speed of only 92.6 meters of drilling per month was attained during the second 6 months as compared with the 172.9 meters of drilling per month attained during the first half of the year.

Another fault in the organization of the production process was the assignment of only one engineer and two technicians to direct the drilling operations for the entire oil field. Since the oil wells extend over an area 45 kilometers

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long, neither the oil wells nor the work of the teams could be properly supervised, and no technical assistance could be given when required. Moreover, the small-tool (bits, rope, etc.) shop was located in Campina. Consequently, whenever a worker needed a tool he had to stop what he was doing and go to Campina to get it. Much time was thus wasted.

Despite the anticipated 100 percent increase in the volume of drilling operations, the administrative management did not concern itself with the acquisition of necessary equipment, especially of derricks. During the first 6 months, the Campina collective had only five derricks, and since these were borrowed from other oil fields they usually arrived after great delays. Thus, at well No 409, the derrick arrived one month late since it had been detained at well No 714 (Targoviste). This led to a month's delay in the beginning of drilling operations at well No 409.

The findings of the decision of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party concerning accidents and damages to equipment are applicable to the Campina oil field.

During the first part of 1950 the number of accidents was very high at Campina, i.e., 26 accidents per 11,223 meters of drilling, or 2.3 accidents per 1,000 meters. These accidents could have been avoided had the management of the oil field taken the necessary precautions. Because no records were kept of the use of tools and machinery, defective ones were frequently used, causing casings and drill collars to break. Had the administrative management taken the necessary measures for enforcing the regulations concerning the protection of casings, at least four of the accidents could have been avoided.

Since no records of the usage of equipment were kept, teams of the various oil fields using the same equipment were usually unaware of its mechanical condition. This often led to accidents which might have been avoided had the proper records been kept. Furthermore, most of the accidents were due to the failure of the management of the oil field to use the appropriate mud for the various geological strata which had to be pierced. Damages to equipment resulting from the use of improper mud accounted for 13 out of the 26 accidents which occurred during the first half of 1950.

As a consequence, during the first half of 1950, 22,000 working hours, representing 38.1 percent of the planned drilling hours, were wasted. It can easily be imagined by how many meters the drilling plan would have been exceeded had these accidents been avoided.

The situation was not much better in extraction at Campina during the first half of 1950. Some 521 oil wells were used for the extraction of crude oil at Campina. Of these, 200 acquired from small enterprises, were in poor condition and equipped with old machinery.

Due to the improper organization, the trouble-shooting teams, i.e., the teams which repair oil wells, were directed by only one technician who, obviously, was unable to supervise closely the work of the teams or supply them with the proper tools.

The first and second sections at Mislea, which were expected to yield more than one half of the crude oil extracted at Campina, were plagued by well equipment so old, and nonstandarized that the various parts of any one well installation could not be used at any other. Work was poorly organized and insufficient transportation facilities were available to the repair teams. All repair teams had to use one trolley. Under the circumstances it is not

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surprising that the replacement of a pump at a Borkman-type oil well which, with the aid of adequate modern equipment should take only 8-16 hours, required 24-28 hours at Mislea. The outmoded installations were responsible for many accidents. Thus, during the first 6 months, there were 17 serious accidents.

Repair-team workers were slow in repairing damaged equipment because they were not paid by the individual repair job but were hired for the duration of the extraction plan. Under the circumstances, the workers had no incentive to work rapidly. This led to a daily loss of dozens of tons of crude oil.

The rather poor professional qualifications of repair-team workers, of whom only 30 percent were able to meet the norms, also accounted for this situation. During the first 6 months, the extraction norms were exceeded on the average by only 5 percent, and even the very best teams did not exceed them by more than 15 percent. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that during the first half of 1950 the actual production cost exceeded the plan by 2.55 percent, and that the actual productivity of labor reached only 92.25 percent of the planned.

Socialist competition was not followed at Campina during the first half of 1950. Due to the disinterested attitude of the trade-union organizations and the lack of sympathy on the part of the management of the oil field, the competition was organized along bureaucratic lines.

To secure pledges for the competition, the administration prepared standard entry forms which were distributed by the chief of the Work and Salary Department to every section. The section chiefs then distributed them among brigades, centers, or individual oil wells.

The brigade leaders summoned all workers to attend brief meetings of 10 to 15 minutes during which the workers were asked to enter the competition. The brigade leaders filled out the standard forms on the basis of the workers' pledges and had the workers sign the completed entry blanks. Under the circumstances, very few workers assumed any definite obligations, most of them being satisfied with mere promises. For instance, in May 1950, Ion Petrescu, mechanic and team leader, pledged to do his work on schedule and avoid wasting materials, while P. Radulescu pledged to keep machinery in good working order, save materials, and work more efficiently. It is quite understandable that a competition organized in this manner was altogether too bureaucratic in character to stimulate workers toward greater achievements.

There were some workers who made concrete pledges, but were unable to ascertain the success of their accomplishments. This is not due to the fact that no achievement records were kept, but because the records were prepared in a formal, awkward, complicated manner, which the workers had difficulty in understanding. The administrative management prepared standard forms on which the workers had to record their achievements. The achievements were evaluated on a complex numerical point basis and had to be recorded as such by the workers, who had difficulty in understanding the point system. As a consequence, the majority of the forms were not filled out.

The failure of trade-union organizations to organize properly the socialist competition was taken to task by the central organ of the Rumanian Workers' Party Scanteia, which demanded the elimination of the formalism and bureaucracy that had prevented the proper organization of the competition.

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Deficiencies were also observed in the field of labor protection. The installation of protective devices was neglected, the oil wells were poorly lit, etc. During the first half of 1950, the equivalent of 503 working days were lost as a result of physical injuries suffered by workers. Aid to the injured workers amounted to 89,802 lei.

This analysis of the activities of the Campina oil field, during the first half of 1950 reveals that in places where the administrative management and the enterprise committee do not concern themselves systematically with the problem of organizing labor and production, and where the systematic organization of socialist competition is neglected, results do not measure up to the efforts of the workers and technicians in the field of production.

The second half of 1950 was the turning point for the Campina collective. Criticism by Scanteia upset the workers and technicians who decided to devote their attention to the better organization of production.

An especially important change occurred at Campina when, at the beginning of the second half of 1950, the administration of the oil field was taken over by Sovrompetrol. The administrative management, guided by the party organization and supported by the trade-union organizations, reorganized the oil field on the structural basis of Sovrompetrol. As a result, there was established not only an office in charge of drilling operations, but also offices in charge of construction, rigging, and major repair services, all responsible for the fulfillment of the tasks of their respective sectors.

As part of the reorganization procedure, several measures were adopted to eliminate the deficiencies which occurred during the first half of 1950. In the drilling sector, each worker was entrusted with definite duties, which increased his sense of responsibility. Moreover, each oil well where drilling operations were in progress was provided with a chart indicating the optimum conditions for drilling, i.e., the bits which should be used at every stratum, and mud which should be used, etc. The chart also indicated the difficulties which were likely to be encountered and the preventive measures which should be taken. These charts are given to the brigade leaders who discuss them with the drilling teams before the beginning of actual drilling operations, so that each driller may know the conditions under which drilling will take place.

The new management carefully planned in advance the location of new oil wells with due care for the configuration of the terrain and for the time required for rigging. Consequently, drilling was completed at 21 oil wells started during the second half of 1950, as well as the six wells started during the first half of 1950. The drilling of the wells on schedule was also due to the fact that the drilling service had ordered the necessary derricks on time. One of the measures adopted for the reorganization of the production process was the organization of a collective headed by an engineer. This assured effective control of all equipment and proper supervision of the functioning of all machinery.

A team was organized to test casings and drill collars to reduce breakage.

Of special importance for the successful completion of the tasks set by the drilling plan was the establishment of a tool section charged with the distribution of tools and equipment. This section was also charged with keeping records of the number of hours tools used, with the prompt repairing of all defective tools, and with the rational allotment of tools according to the specific needs of the workers.

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The prevention of accidents and damage to equipment has been one of the principal concerns of the administrative management. A laboratory for mud study and analysis, which found solutions for correcting its characteristics, was established. A method of treating mud has been adopted to facilitate drilling in salt, or soil with high saline content, maintain the bore of the well in good condition, and to reduce the numbers of accidents and the time required for repairs.

In accordance with Soviet experience, the casing system was altered so that one additional drill column is used. This reduces the number of cave-ins at the surface.

As a result, the number of accidents diminished substantially and the time required for repairs was also reduced. During the third quarter six accidents occurred requiring 2,807 hours of repair work, i.e., 7.76 percent of the total drilling hours required by the plan. During the fourth quarter 11 accidents occurred but the repairs were performed in only 975 hours, i.e., 3.95 percent of the total drilling hours required by the plan for this period. During the first half of 1950, accidents represented 2.3 percent of each 1,000 drilled-meters, while during the second half they represented only 0.61 percent.

In analyzing the total number of drilling hours, we observe that during the first quarter the nonproductive time was 63.7 percent, during the third it declined to 20.4 percent, and during the fourth to only 10.8 percent of the total time spent in drilling. This clearly illustrates the advantages of rational utilization of drilling equipment.

Also a substantial increase in the effectiveness of derricks was achieved, as witnessed by the fact that the plan for commercial oil exploitation was exceeded by 21 percent.

Due to the measures taken at the Campina oil field the tasks set by the plan for drilling were exceeded by 5.14 percent and for the productivity of labor by 9 percent.

The production process was also reorganized during the second half of 1950 at Campina. The number of repair teams was increased from 5 to 18, while depth-drilling teams were placed under the command of a brigade leader. To stimulate the efficiency of repair-team workers, they were paid by the repair job.

For the first time, production brigades were established whose function is to put into operation the wells whose drilling has been completed. This resulted in the more rapid operation of new wells, which, in turn, was responsible for the surpassing of the production program of the oil field by 4.51 percent.

The oil field was well supplied with tools and materials. The improvement of the supply process directly contributed to the fulfillment of the tasks set by the plan at Campina.

A major contribution to the fulfillment of the plan was made by the reorganization of technological service. Technological studies are important because they determine the most effective manner for treating old wells to obtain an increased yield of crude oil. Reactivation of abandoned wells, increasing the efficiency of old wells, putting wells in production ahead of schedule, reducing the time necessary for repairs -- these were the steps which assured increases in crude oil production at the Campina oil field.

Oil-well repairs were performed in accordance with the findings of technological studies of old wells, i.e., repairs were performed both on active and inactive wells. This brought about the reactivation of several wells and in certain cases the repairs performed permitted a higher yield of crude oil to be obtained. For example, well No 230SR yielded 14.6 percent more crude oil after cleaning. The study of the chart of well No 129SR revealed that production could be increased. By changing the pump and increasing the movement of the piston from 0.90 meters to 1.35 meters, the production of crude oil was increased by 13 tons per month. Also, it was possible to obtain 2 tons of crude oil daily from abandoned well No 5P. Similarly, the yield of well No 257 was tripled by reboring.

In general, as a result of the technological study of old wells and of the newly adopted measures, the Campina oil field collective produced an average of 630 tons of crude oil per month thus exceeding the requirements of the plan for old wells by 0.56 percent.

The concern for higher production led to the discovery of the best methods for obtaining maximum yields of crude oil. The mechanization of extracting operations at 23 oil wells resulted in an average 10 percent increase in production and the freeing of 102 workers for work elsewhere. An economy of 500,000 lei a month was thus achieved. Thus the yield of well No 827, where extracting operations were mechanized, was doubled, and of well No 69 nearly tripled.

At Sections I and II of Mislea an important innovation was adopted when pumping centers were established. As a result, 50 workers were freed to form teams for other wells and several new oil well repair teams were formed. In addition, 20 installations (thermal and electric motors, friction machines, etc.) became available for use elsewhere. Consequently, there was a further reduction in the consumption of electric energy amounting to 600,000 lei a month.

An important contribution toward the accomplishment of the tasks set by the plan was made by the oil-well repair teams, which have reduced the time required for repairs by exceeding the norms, thus succeeding in putting a large number of wells into operation more rapidly. During the second half of 1950, brigade 2, commanded by Vasile Pantazi, exceeded the norms for required repair work on wells by 18.21 percent.

The reduction of the time required for repair work was, to a large extent, due to a more extensive use of cranes and resulted in important economies in production.

As a result of studies and the activities of the collective for extraction, nine wells, formerly abandoned because they required new investment of capital were put back into operation. These wells, not included in the production program, yielded 6.1 tons of crude oil daily contributing one percent to the realization of the extraction plan for the oil field.

The question of reactivating oil fields was discussed extensively in meetings of trade-union organizations. Many oil-well workers suggested the reactivation of several abandoned wells. The suggestions, supported by party organization and by trade-union organs, were accepted and the oil wells were put back into production.

Thus oil-well worker Tanase Dumitrica suggested that well No 385 (Filipestii de Padure), which had been abandoned for many years, be reactivated. Following reactivation, the well yields 0.600 tons every 24 hours. Likewise, abandoned well No 171 (Vladoiu), whose reactivation was suggested by oil-well

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Workers Constantin Pacuretiu, Mihai Costache, and Niculae Stoica, now yield 0.700 tons every 24 hours. Due to the fact that the reactivated wells were connected with nearby pumping centers, the expenses involved in putting them back into operation were very small. Thus, many tons of crude oil, not provided for by the plan, were obtained without special effort or expense.

By shortening the time required for oil-well repairs, by the more effective planning and organization of labor in the oil field, damaged equipment was repaired more efficiently, and, consequently, an exploitation coefficient of 98.5 percent, the highest ever, was attained at Campina. This coefficient clearly reflects the fruitful labors performed by the Campina collective during the second half of 1950. As a result of this activity, the requirements of the plan for crude oil extraction were exceeded by 0.63 percent and the productivity of labor increased by 9 percent which brought about a 4-percent reduction in production costs during the third quarter of 1950.

The measures adopted by the administrative management and the trade-union organizations for improving the professional qualifications of the oil-well workers also contributed to the achievement of these results. Three courses for qualification to grades 1 and 2 were given at Busteni, Campina, and Mislea. The workers attended these courses after working hours. The necessary books and supplies were given to them. The teachers were recruited from among the best engineers and technicians. In view of the regular attendance, the schooling plan for oil well workers was exceeded by 35 percent. At Busteni and Campina alone, 60 oil-well workers and 50 expert drillers received their certificates of proficiency.

The higher professional qualifications gained by the workers is clearly reflected in their surpassing of norms. During the second half of 1950, the oil-well repair teams exceeded the norms by 25 percent. The leaders' team, headed by Constantin Pascu exceeded the norms in October and November by 32 percent.

Many oil-well repair teams which were unable to meet the norms during the first half of 1950 exceeded them by large margins during the second. Thus, the oil-well repair team led by Stelian Tanase which during the first half of 1950 attained only 95 percent of the norm, became the best team during the second when it exceeded the norm by 30 percent. Likewise, the team led by Nicolae Costea, which attained only 85 percent of the norm during the first half of 1950, exceeded it during the second by 5 percent.

The party, through the just criticism expressed by its central organ, Scanteia, has contributed largely to the achievement of these impressive results. As a result of this criticism, the trade-union organs directed by the party organization have made every effort to enlist the workers in the struggle for the fulfillment of the tasks set by the plan.

The trade-union committee began the reorganization of trade-union groups and sections which, to a large extent, existed only on paper. Production conferences by groups and sections were organized for the purpose of analyzing the deficiencies which had occurred during the competition of the first half of 1950 and also for the purpose of organizing new socialist competitions. The harmful custom of having the brigade leaders fill out the entry forms was done away with. Instead, each worker filled out the form personally on the basis of his pledges and handed it over to the leader of the group. Thus, the pledges lost their formal and bureaucratic character and the workers became more eager to fulfill the tasks set by the plan.

During regular production conferences not being held, workers report deficiencies in production and, as already indicated, make specific recommendations including the reactivation of abandoned oil wells.

The administrative organs closely watched the achievements of the socialist competition. The manner in which the pledges were executed was duly reported to group and section production conferences. Charts, prepared by brigade leaders, recording the progress of each competing team were posted at each oil well. Concurrently, much agitation-propaganda work was carried out among the workers by using slogans and posters illustrating the achievements of the production leaders and also by posting achievement reports and criticisms of deficiencies on bulletin boards.

As a result of the more effective organization of socialist competition, of the closer supervision of the manner in which the pledges were carried out, and of the popularizing of the achievements of the leading workers, 92 percent of the total number of employees entered the competition.

The enterprise committee also took steps to assist workers and technicians in acquiring new Soviet methods. As a result of exchanges of experience with the Moreni and Gura Ocnitei oil fields, it was possible to adopt several new technological measures, thus realizing a production surplus of 49 tons of crude oil.

Favorable results were obtained in the drilling sector by using the Soviet method of forced drilling at seven oil wells. As a consequence of the utilization of this method, the drilling time was cut by half and the norms were substantially exceeded, thus allowing the oil workers to gain substantial additional earnings. For instance, the drilling team headed by Ion Enache, Constantin Christian, and Dumitru Oltereanu, by using the Soviet method of forced drilling at well No 829, completed their work in 58 days rather than in the scheduled 90. By drilling a well 32 days ahead of schedule, Ion Enache earned 25,749 lei, and Petru Ionita, a member of the team, 16,255 lei.

Trade-union organs were also active in supporting the drive for economies. As a consequence of the more efficient organization of the struggle for economies at Section I (Mislea) alone, economies exceeding one million lei were realized during the months of November and December 1950.

Chief Mechanic Nicolae Repeteanu especially distinguished himself in the struggle for economies by installing, with the aid of two teams from the conduit installation service, a 5-inch conduit connecting the Campina Bucea Pumping Station with the Baicoi CFR (Rumanian Railroad) line. On the initiative of the chief mechanic, the pipe was passed under the bed of the Prahova River at a depth of one meter, rather than over the special bridge for conduits. Thus 1,350,000 lei worth of working hours and materials were saved.

The problem of the protection of labor has been of great concern to the trade-union organs which worked closely with the oil-field management in adopting several measures. During the second half of 1950, protective devices, steps for towers, and electrical equipment were installed. In addition, movable barracks were built for the use of drilling teams, central heating systems were installed in various buildings, etc. Posters showing the proper working manner for avoiding accidents and instructions concerning work safety were posted everywhere. Protective equipment, such as protective eye glasses, helmets, safety belts, etc., were distributed among workers.

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

These measures were responsible for fewer workers (20) being injured during the second half of 1950. Thus, only 71 working days were lost during this period in contrast with the 503 days lost during the first half of the year.

Despite these important achievements, the collective of the Sovrompetrol-Campina oil field had to cope with certain difficulties and revealed certain deficiencies.

The trade-union organizations failed to adopt measures designed to strengthen labor discipline and prevent absenteeism. As a consequence, absenteeism increased during the second half of 1950, reaching 2.11 percent during the last months of the year as compared to the 0.58 percent of the first months. Under such circumstances workers' teams could not work at top efficiency. The failure of the trade-union organizations is further illustrated by the survival of the so-called Sipca system at Bordeeni, Mislea, and Runcu Bustenari. Under this system, drillers work for 16, 24, or even 30 consecutive hours with only a few hours of sleep. This was responsible for the low efficiency of labor and the poor health of the workers at the oil fields.

Obviously, had the trade-union organizations, in conjunction with the administration performed their functions in a more efficient manner, this situation could have been avoided.

The trade-union committee also revealed weaknesses in organizing the socialist competition by insufficient supervision of its progress and by maintaining the system of standardized entry forms. This serious deficiency was remedied only in the beginning of 1951.

Another important problem was that of equipment. Today most of the equipment is manufactured in Rumania. The machine-building industry has thus far been able to lend much assistance to the oil industry by supplying it with large quantities of equipment of good quality. Nevertheless, some difficulties were encountered since not all the equipment supplied by the machine-building industry was satisfactory. Some of the equipment delivered was defective and had to be returned to the manufacturer for repairs. It is, therefore, essential that the manufacturers pay more attention to the quality of the equipment which they deliver in order to contribute more effectively to the development of our oil industry.

Despite the deficiencies and difficulties indicated above, despite the fact that the Campina oil field is one of the oldest in the country and is largely equipped with old equipment, its collective, under the guidance of the party organization and the control of the trade-union groups, succeeded in achieving the best results of any oil field in the country in the second half of 1950.

The decision of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party of 3 February 1951 -- an invaluable guide for the struggle of oil workers to fulfill the tasks set for them by the First Five-Year Plan -- reveals the deficiencies and difficulties which still prevail in our oil industry.

These shortcomings and difficulties are primarily due to certain organizational deficiencies, to insufficient supervision of the plan at each oil field, to weaknesses in planning, to the absence of adequate personnel, and to the lack of personal responsibility at certain oil fields.

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Without any doubt, the administrative organizations are responsible for many of these deficiencies. It is also certain, however, that trade-union organizations share the responsibility. There were instances in which the trade unions not only failed to work toward the elimination of deficiencies and difficulties, but actually supported certain unjust demands, inadequate personnel, etc.

This analysis of the labor force at the Baicoi and Campina oil fields clearly demonstrates the correctness of the findings of the decision of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party and of the Council of Ministers, and of the solutions indicated for the elimination of deficiencies.

Measures of improving the living conditions of oil workers and technicians, for constructing new homes, for improving transportation facilities, as well as measures concerning vacations, ration cards, wages, awarding of distinctions for superior accident-free drilling should be adopted. Such measures would serve as stimuli for increasing the zeal of all workers in the oil industry.

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